

# Transactive Control in Transportation Systems

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
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(collaborative work with D'Achiardi, Guan, Tseng, Yanakiev, Mazumder, and Pilo)

Workshop on Autonomous Energy Systems, August 19-20, 2020



# Paradigm Shift



## Grid of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century



- Centralized generation
- Limited visibility
- Passive loads
- Limited resilience
- Passive Edge

## Grid of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century


- Distributed generation
- Visibility with varied sensors
- Controllable loads
- Intelligent edge
- Dynamic
- Billions of controllable nodes

# Power Balance:

# Becoming Dynamic




# Power Balance: Traditional



# Power Balance: Becoming Distributed

Distributed power flow, computed in real-time to ensure grid performance with new technologies



# This Talk: Distributed Optimization Using Trains


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- Transactive Control in Transportation Systems
- Co-optimization of train scheduling and grid-scheduling
  - Railway grid Dynamic Market Mechanism (*rDMM*)
  - Train Dispatch
- Simulations – Amtrak Northeast Corridor (NEC)
- Co-optimization of interdependent infrastructures
  - Wind Power Producers & Natural Gas Producers
  - Electricity and NG Markets
- Summary

# TRANSACTIVE CONTROL

# Story of Demand Response

## Generation = Demand







- Modern grid characterized by increased penetration of renewables energy resources (RERs) leading to intermittent supply
- Storage is a great resource, but fast-acting storage is still expensive
- Flexible demand is needed to ensure power balance and cost efficiency




# Demand Response

- Voluntary change in the energy consumption of an electric utility customer to better match the demand for power with the supply.
- Most ISOs and Utilities offer incentive DR programs (e.g. PJM and PG&E)
- DR taxonomies based on the end-users' sectors: residential, commercial buildings, industrial, and transportation



# Transactive Control


Transactive control: A mechanism through which system- and component-level decisions are made through economic **transactions** between the components of the system, in conjunction with or in lieu of traditional controls.\*



Transactive energy: A system of economic and control mechanisms that allows the dynamic balance of supply and demand across the entire electrical infrastructure using value as a key operational parameter.\*\*

\* Gridwise Architectural Council, 1982 ; \*\* NIST, 2017

# Transactive Control in Smart Grids



# Pacific Northwest Demonstration Project

## What:


- \$178M, ARRA-funded, 5-year demonstration
- 60,000 metered customers in 5 states

## Why:

- Quantify costs and benefits
- Develop communications protocol
- Develop standards
- Facilitate integration of wind and other renewables

## Who:



Led by Battelle and partners including BPA, 11 utilities, 2 universities, and 5 vendors




Reference: Courtesy Jakob Stoustrup, Tutorial, American Control Conference, 2016

# Transactive Control

A mechanism through which system- and component-level decisions are made through economic **transactions** between the components of the system, in conjunction with or in lieu of traditional controls




(From J. Stoustrup, Tutorial, ACC Workshop, 2016)



# Transactive Control in Transportation Systems





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Example 1: Dynamic Toll-pricing for congestion reduction

Example 2: Shared Mobility on Demand using Dynamic Routing and Pricing



# Toll pricing controller\*



- Logistic Function
- Identify parameters
- Use inverse nonlinearity in the price-controller



# Response to High Input Flow

High input flow is introduced in the middle of the operating period to test the systems' ability to prevent congestion. Our model-based control (blue) is successful in keeping the HOT density low compared to MnPASS (red).





# Transactive Control in Shared Mobility\*



$p_R^S$ : subjective probability of acceptance framed by  $R$

# Passenger Acceptance: Utility Function

- Utility function (for passenger  $k$ )

$$U_{a_k} = a + b_p \cdot WalkT_{pk} + b_w \cdot WaitT_k + b_r \cdot RideT_k + b_d \cdot WalkT_{dk} + \gamma \cdot \rho_k$$

- Discrete choice model (two alternatives;  $U_{a_k}, U'_{a_k}$ )

- Probability of acceptance:  $p_{a_k}$

$$p_{a_k} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\rho \Delta U_k}}, \quad \Delta U_k = U_{a_k} - U'_{a_k}$$



# Conventional Utility Theory (contd.)

- Several alternatives with utilities
- Corresponding probabilities

$$U_{a_1}, \dots, U_{a_n}$$

$$p_1, \dots, p_n$$



Utility function of ride-sharing

$$u_i = \sum_{j=1}^m U_{a_i}^j p_i^j$$

$$U_{a_k} = f(\tau), \quad \tau \in [t_p^1, t_p^2]$$

$u_1$ : Utility function of taking a private car;

$$u_i = \int_{t_p^1}^{t_p^2} U_a(\tau) p_i(\tau) d\tau$$

$u_n$ : Utility function of taking a bus

- Not adequate if uncertainty is large

# Prospect Theory – Decision under Uncertainty

- The theory was created in 1979<sup>1</sup> and developed in 1992<sup>2</sup> by Kahneman and Tversky
- Winner of Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001
- One of the foundations of behavioral economics
- Captures how human beings make decisions under risk



Daniel Kahneman



Amos Tversky

1. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk." Handbook of the fundamentals of financial decision making: Part I. 2013. 99-127.
2. Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. "Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty." *Journal of Risk and uncertainty* 5.4 (1992): 297-323.

# Prospect Theory for Mode Choice\*

- In prospect theory\*:

$$u_i = \sum_{j=1}^m V(u_i^j) \pi(p_i^j)$$

- Human beings are irrational in two ways:



1. How do we perceive utility  $V(u_i^j)$ : loss aversion - losses hurt more than the benefit of gains

$$V(u_i^j) = \begin{cases} (u_i^j - R)^{\beta^+}, & \text{if } u_i^j > R \\ -\lambda(R - u_i^j)^{\beta^-}, & \text{if } u_i^j < R \end{cases}$$

$R$ : Frames the problem;  $\lambda > 1$

2. How do we assess probability  $\pi(p_i^j)$ : overreact to small probability events and underreact to large probability events

$$\pi(p_i^j) = \exp(-(-\ln p_i^j)^\alpha), \quad \alpha < 1$$



\* Kahneman and Tversky, 1992

# Prospect Theory for Shared Mobility

- The utility function is a combination of time and price:

$$u = a + b_p T_{walk} + b_w T_{wait} + b_r T_{ride} + \gamma \rho$$

- $\tau \in [t_p^1, t_p^2]$ ,  $u: u(\tau)$ ;  $\tau$ : Shuttle arrival interval

$$U_R^S = \int_{-\infty}^R V(u) \frac{d}{du} \{\pi[F_U(u)]\} du + \int_R^{\infty} V(u) \frac{d}{du} \{-\pi[1 - F_U(U)]\} du$$

- $R$ : reference
- $F(\tau) = \int_{-\infty}^{\tau} df(\tau)$  - Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
  - Extract from demand pattern and historical data
  - $F(\tau)$  exists but unknown

Objective probability of acceptance


$$p^o = \frac{e^{U^o}}{e^{U^o} + e^{A^o}}$$

$U^o$  and  $A^o$ : objective utility of the SMO DS and the alternative



Subjective probability of acceptance

$$p_R^S = \frac{e^{U_R^S}}{e^{U_R^S} + e^{A_R^S}}$$

$U_R^S$  and  $A_R^S$ : subjective utility of the SMO DS and the alternative



# Results\*




Workshop on Autonomous Energy Systems, August 19-20,

\* A. M. Annaswamy, Y. Guan, H. E. Tseng, H. Zhou, T. Phan and D. Yanakiev, "Transactive Control in Smart Cities," in Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 106, no. 4, pp. 518-537, April 2018.

# CO-OPTIMIZATION OF GRID-SCHEDULING AND TRAIN-SCHEDULING




# Transactive Control in Power Grids



\* D. D'Achiardi, A.M. Annaswamy, S.K. Mazumder, and E. Pilo, Transactive Control of Electric Railways, <http://arxiv.org/abs/2006.08119>

# Smart Railway Technologies


- Automation technologies yield trains that can follow optimal trajectories
  - e.g. Positive Train Control (PTC) in US Northeast Corridor
- Train operators maintain a schedule margin to meet timeliness objectives
  - 15% margins on US schedules, 7% in Europe [1]
- Bidirectional power flow enabled by regenerative braking in electric trains (deceleration  $\equiv$  inject power into the grid)
- Integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) 
  - Reduce operational costs
  - Reduce carbon footprint
  - Improve resiliency (e.g. return trains to stations during blackouts)

[1] Transit Matters. "Regional Rail for Metropolitan Boston." Boston, MA. URL: <http://transitmatters.org/regional-rail-doc>


[4rail.net](http://4rail.net)



[ConEd](http://ConEd.com): NYC Subway 7 Line




# An Example: Trip from Boston to New Haven



- University Park, MA  
→ Providence, RI → New Haven, CT
- 4 dispatch regions → 4 Area Control Centers (ACC)
- Each ACC faces hourly energy pricing from utility service
- Several dispatchable DERs at each ACC
- Goal: Grid (DER)+Train optimization

# DERs at University Park Station, MA

## Electric load estimate –NREL SAM




1.6MW<sub>e</sub>  
CHP



2.8MW<sub>DC</sub> PV  
Array

Solar Irradiance [W/m<sup>2</sup>]




NREL SAM

Amtrak NEC Train  
track

ENGINE TYPE	UNITS	CG170-16	
Electrical power <sup>2)</sup>	kW <sub>e</sub>	1,550	
Mean effective pressure	bar psi	18.2	264
Thermal output (+/- 8 %) <sup>3)</sup>	kW Btu/m	1,589	2,003
Electrical efficiency <sup>2)</sup>	%	43.0	
Thermal efficiency <sup>3)</sup>	%	43.7	
Total efficiency	%	86.7	

NO<sub>x</sub> ≤ 500 mg/Nm<sup>3</sup>, 1 g/bhp-h

# A 2-step optimization approach\*



\* D. D'Achiardi, A.M. Annaswamy, S.K. Mazumder, and E. Pilo, Transactive Control of Electric Railways, <http://arxiv.org/abs/2006.08119>  
Workshop on Autonomous Energy Systems, August 19-20, 2020

# Step 1: DER dispatch using DMM\*

$$\min_{y_i, i \in \mathcal{A}_n} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{A}_n} J_i(y_i)$$

s.t.

$$h_e = \hat{p}^{re} + \hat{p}^T + \hat{p}^e - \sum_{i \in \mathcal{A}_n} g_i^e(y_i) = 0$$

$$h_{th} = \hat{p}^{th} - \sum_{i \in \mathcal{A}_n} g_i^{th}(y_i) = 0$$

$$\underline{y}_i \leq y_i \leq \bar{y}_i$$

cost minimization



power balance

thermal balance

capacity constraints

A Dynamic Market Mechanism Approach to OPF:

$$L(x, \rho, \gamma) = f(x) + \rho^T h(x) + \gamma^T g(x)$$

$$x(k+1) = x(k) - \alpha_1 \nabla_x L(x^k, \rho^k, \gamma^k)$$


$$\rho(k+1) = \rho(k) - \alpha_2 \nabla_\rho L(x^k, \rho^k, \gamma^k)$$

\* A. Kiani and A.M. Annaswamy. [“A Dynamic Mechanism for Wholesale Energy Market: Stability and Robustness”](#), IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2014.

# Step 1: DER dispatch using DMM

DMM: Dynamic Market Mechanisms – allows real-time information regarding renewables and loads to be incorporated.\*

Primal update: 
$$y_i^{k+1} = y_i^k - \beta_{y_i} \left( \nabla_{y_i} J_i(y_i^k) + [\nabla_{y_i} h^e]^T \lambda_{e,j}^k - [\nabla_{y_i} h^{th}]^T \lambda_{th,j}^k \right)$$



\*A.B. Kiani, A.M. Annaswamy, and T. Samad, "A Hierarchical Transactive Control Architecture for Renewables Integration in Smart Grids" in IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2014.

# Step 2: Train Dispatch

$$\min_{P_l(\tau)} \int_{\tau=t_0}^{\tau=t_f} P_l(\tau) \lambda_l(\tau) d\tau \quad \text{given } \lambda_l(\cdot)$$

s.t.

$$m \ddot{x}_l + F_{DF,l}(\dot{x}_l) + m_l g \sin(\alpha(x_l)) = F_{T,l} \left( \frac{P_l}{\dot{x}_l} \right),$$

$$\underline{P}_l \leq P_l \leq \bar{P}_l,$$

$$\underline{F}_{T,l} \leq F_{T,l} \leq \bar{F}_{T,l},$$

$$\underline{a}_l \leq \ddot{x}_l \leq \bar{a}_l,$$

$$\underline{v}_l \leq \dot{x}_l \leq \bar{v}_l,$$

$$t_{l,a}(s) \geq \underline{t}_l(s),$$

$$t_{l,d}(s) \leq \bar{t}_l(s),$$

Cost Minimization Objective

Results in  $P_{1,1}^*, P_{1,2}^*, P_{1,3}^*, P_{2,3}^*$

train motion dynamics

power bounds


traction force bounds

acceleration bounds

speed bounds


minimum arrival time station  $s$

maximum departure time station  $s$






# A 2-step optimization approach\*



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

# CO-OPTIMIZATION OF GRID-SCHEDULING AND TRAIN-SCHEDULING

# Simulations – Train Location & Dispatch Profiles



Field data: Yields a total trip-cost of \$200


# Simulations – Train Location & Dispatch Profiles



62% energy cost reduction from field to minimum work (train only optimization) (\$200→\$76)

# Simulations – train location & dispatch profiles

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- Distributed Optimization approach (grid+train) results in a 80% cost reduction per trip compared to field (\$200→\$40)
- A 47% trip-cost reduction compared to a minimum work (train-only optimization)

# CO-OPTIMIZATION OF INTER-DEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURES









# Renewable and Natural Gas Power Plant Partnerships\*

## Problem


- Urgent need to accommodate renewables
- Speculation: Renewables will need to be dispatched (not treated as negative load)
- Speculation: Penalties  $\lambda_p = \alpha \lambda_{DA}$ ,  $\alpha > 1$  for unmet commitments
  - may discourage renewable utilization

## Approach

Secondary market to cover unmet commitments at lower cost  $\pi_{RC} = \beta \lambda_{DA}$ ,  $\beta < \alpha$

	Baseline – No Contract	Reliability Contract
RPP Shortfall	 	 
RPP Curtailment	 	 

## Results



$$\alpha = 1.5. \quad \beta = 1.09$$

Renewable utilization increase from 74% to 88%

Yearly profits increase by \$863 thousand for each party


## Impact

- Reliability contracts “firm up” commitments
- NGPPs benefit from exclusive energy rights to RPP shortfalls.
- RPPs benefit from reduced penalty payments
  - (1) more aggressive bidding
  - (2) higher renewable utilization



\* D. D'Achiardi, N. Aguiar, S. Baros, V. Gupta and A. M. Annaswamy. [Reliability Contracts Between Renewable and Natural Gas Power Producers](#). In *IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems*, 2019

# Interdependency between NG and Electricity Networks – Market Flow\*

Natural Gas Network



IEEE 118-bus Electricity Network



- Two main issues: (a) Market misalignment (b) Unequal access to gas between NGPPs (GenCos) and RCITs (LDCs)
- Analysis of vulnerabilities was carried out.

\* N. Nandakumar and A. M. Annaswamy, "Impact of increased renewables on natural gas markets in eastern United States," in *Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy*, May 2017  
Workshop on Autonomous Energy Systems, August 19-20, 2020



# Summary

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## Distributed Optimization Using Trains

- Transactive Control in Transportation Systems
- Co-optimization of train scheduling and grid-scheduling
  - Railway grid Dynamic Market Mechanism (*rDMM*)
  - Train Dispatch
- Simulations – Amtrak Northeast Corridor (NEC)
- Co-optimization of interdependent infrastructures
  - Wind Power Producers & Natural Gas Producers
  - Electricity and NG Markets

# A recent “9 pm for 9 minutes” event in India on April 9, 2020





Figure 11: All India Demand Trend during the lights off event [1]

[1] Report on Pan India Lights Off Event 9 PM 9 Minutes [<https://posoco.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Report-on-Pan-India-Lights-Off-Event-9-PM-9-Minutes-on-5th-April-2020.pdf>]

[2] ISO-NE Duck Curve [<https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2018/05/08/the-duck-curve-comes-to-new-england/>]

# What's next? Towards Ultra-Distributed Control



— 9 PM 9 Minutes  
— Duck curve



# THANK YOU!